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Germany, Japan, and the United States continue to view foreign exchange 
intervention as an effective instrument, although the mechanism through which 
it operates is unclear.  In this paper, we use official data on daily dollar 
intervention to examine itsimpact on exchange-rate risk premia through both 
the portfolio-balance  and expectations channels.  We define the risk premium 
in terms of deviation from uncovered interest parity and model its behavior 
using generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity.  Our evidence 
of portfolio-balance and expectations effects is inconsistent across 
subperiods of different exchange-rate-policy  regimes. Also, unlike Dominguez 
(1990) and Loopesko (1984), we find no evidence that coordination of 
intervention improves its efficacy. 
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Host large industrial countries continue to regard exchange-market 
intervention as a viable policy for influencing exchange rates independently 
of their monetary policies.  In theory, sterilized intervention can affect 
exchange rates either through its impact on relative asset supplies or by 
altering expectations.  Because these channels differ in their policy 
implications, recent studies have attempted to distinguish between them.  If 
intervention  operates by altering expectations, it is probably because the 
central bank has inside information about monetary policy that it is able to 
communicate to the market.  The credibility of the implied change in policy 
may be crucial.  If the portfolio-balance channel is operative, the shift in 
relative supplies of assets denominated in different currencies is all that 
matters. 
In this paper, we use official daily intervention data to investigate 
the effects of German, Japanese, and U.S.  (G3) intervention on  exchange-rate 
risk premia, defined as deviations from uncovered interest parity (UIP). 
Loopesko (1984) and Dominguez (1990) also look at deviations from UIP, but 
they use different measures of intervention.  Loopesko calculates cumulative 
intervention from the beginning of  her sample,  whereas Dominguez utilizes 
day-to-day  intervention flows.  We adopt both approaches here to facilitate 
comparisons of our results, and we also extend the analysis in a number of 
important ways.  First, we estimate the model over a longer time frame, 
dividing the sample into subperiods that correspond to different U.S. 
intervention policies.  Second, we examine the impact of dollar intervention 
by all other Group-of-Ten (G10) countries.  Third, we control for day-of-the- 
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exchange-rate  studies (see Hsieh [I9881 and Baillie and Bollerslev [1989]). 
Finally, because of recent advances in modeling asset returns,  we utilize the 
generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) framework, 
which allows movements in conditional  variance to be analyzed directly.  In 
addition to accommodating  heteroscedastic errors, our GARCH model accounts for 
leptokurtosis by assuming a fat-tailed,  student-t  distribution. 
Ideally, we would test for portfolio-balance  effects by including 
measures of daily relative asset supplies.  However, since high-quality daily 
data are unavailable, we use cumulative dollar intervention,  which corresponds 
to the net dollar change in portfolios.  To test for the presence of an 
expectations channel, we include daily intervention flows, which correspond 
more closely to the information  provided by the most recent interventions.  We 
also distinguish between coordinated and unilateral intervention.  If just the 
portfolio-balance channel were operative, neither coordination nor the 
identities of the intervening countries would matter. 
For the full sample, we find that 1) cumulative bilateral intervention 
influences the conditional  mean of the deviation from UIP (our risk premium) 
for the mark-dollar case,  but not for the yen-dollar case, and 2)  among the 
categories of coordinated and unilateral interventions, only unilateral 
Japanese and German interventions are significant.  We also find evidence of 
day-of-the-week  effects in both the conditional  mean and conditional variance. 
Surprisingly,  when we attempt to control for regime shifts by examining 
subperiods, the links between intervention and risk premia are not 
strengthened. 
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presents a review of the literature on risk premia and intervention as 
background for the empirical work that follows.  In section 11, we present our 
measure of the risk premium, introduce the GARCH  framework, and define 
alternative  measures of intervention.  In section 111, we present our results, 
and in section IV, we interpret our findings. 
I.  Related Literature 
ss 
There is no consensus regarding the appropriate theoretical framework 
for analyzing exchange-rate  risk premia.  Lucas'  (1982) intertemporal, 
dynamic, two-country  model implies that risk premia should be related both to 
preferences and to the stochastic behavior of the driving processes, such as 
monetary policy.  Building on this model, Hodrick (1989) relates the forward 
premium to conditional means and variances of market fundamentals.  Osterberg 
(1989) extends this model further to include intervention.  The intertemporal 
capital asset pricing model (Engel and Rodrigues [1987],  Giovannini and Jorion 
[1989],  and Mark [1988]) suggests that risk premia should be related to 
covariances among asset returns.  The consumption-based  capital asset pricing 
model (Hodrick [1989], Cumby [1988]) has specific implications for covariation 
between asset returns and intertemporal marginal rates of substitution in 
utility.  Option pricing theory implies that risk premia are embedded in 
foreign-currency  options prices (Lyons [1988],  KcCurdy and Morgan [1988]). 
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Empirical evidence favoring the existence of a risk premium in foreign 
exchange rates is indirect.  Violation of UIP and rejection of unbiasedness in 
the forward market both suggest that a risk premium may exist.  Unfortunately, 
tests of UIP or of the relationship between forward and future spot rates are 
joint examinations of market efficiency, perfect substitutability, and capital 
mobility. 
The poor out-of-sample  forecasting performance of exchange-rate  models 
also may reflect the existence of risk premia.  The variance of exchange rates 
seems to show persistence, with distinct periods of low and high volatility. 
Such evidence has led to attempts to explain time variation in the conditional 
variance of exchange rates in terms of exogenous processes such as money and 
output.  Moreover, various researchers have implied that policy shifts may be 
related to volatility in asset prices.  Such questions about exogenous 
processes and policy shifts provide a motive for examining the impact of 
intervention on the risk premium. 
Many efforts to model the conditional variances of exchange rates 
utilize autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) or one of its 
variants, GARCH or and GARCH-M (see Baillie and Bollerslev [I9891 and Hsieh 
[I9891  ) .  GARCH allows for conditional normality combined with a 
leptokurtotic,  symmetric, unconditional distribution,  which is consistent with 
the fat tails  -typically  found in asset-return  data.  Baillie and Bollerslev 
Hodrick (1987) and Baillie and McMahon (1989) provide excellent overviews 
of this literature. 
'  Domowitz and Hakkio (1985) and Baillie and Osterberg (1991) model the 
risk premium, defined in terms of forward forecast errors, using variants of 
GARCH  . 
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of exchange rates using a version of GARCH in which the conditional 
distribution is a student-t.  Hsieh (1989) examines distributional assumptions 
other than the student-t  to show how they can be combined with GARCH to remove 
heteroscedasticity from similar data.  Lastrapes (1989) uses GARCH to examine 
how policy regime shifts may help to explain exchange-rate  volatility. 
Pagan and Hong (1988) and Nelson (1987) point out the limitations of 
ARCH as a vehicle for explaining conditional variance, while Hodrick (1987, 
p.  110) argues that ARCH may be inappropriate for analyzing volatility in 
exchange rates.  If high-risk  premia are rooted in policy uncertainty, then 
clarification  by policymakers should reduce such premia.  However, because 
ARCH implies persistence in conditional  variance, the implied risk premia 
would be reduced only after a period of lower ex-post volatility. 
Channels of Influence for Central-Bank Intervention 
Official exchange-market intervention  creates an incipient change in 
a nation's  money stock,  which most large countries claim to sterilize through 
open-market transactions.  Although sterilized intervention does not affect 
the monetary base, it does alter the relative stocks of domestic and 
foreign-currency-denominated  government debt.  According to the 
portfolio-balance theory of exchange-rate  determination, if Ricardian 
equivalence does not hold, if bonds are imperfect substitutes in investors* 
portfolios, and if capital is perfectly mobile, intervention can alter 
exchange rates by changing the relative risk premia on governments*  debt (see 
Weber [I9861 and Backus and Kehoe [1988]).  Surveying the related empirical 
literature,  Edison (1990) finds either that there is no statistically 
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or that the elasticity is too small to be of any practical importance to 
policymakers. 
Intervention  may also alter exchange rates by  influencing market 
expectations.  In one version of the expectations channel, markets are viewed 
as weak-form efficient, and central banks can credibly signal inside 
information about future monetary policy via sterilized intervention (see 
Obstfeld [I9891 and Dominguez [1988]).  Klein and Rosengren (1991) find that 
intervention from 1985 to 1987 was instead used to clarify imprecise policy 
announcements.  In  another version of the expectations channel, exchange 
markets are viewed as subject to frequent, but temporary,  periods of 
inefficiency.  Investigations  of survey data by Frankel and Froot (1987) and 
Ito (1990) tend to support this finding by  casting doubt on the wisdom of 
applying the rational expectations assumption to exchange rates.  Under such 
circumstances, a well-informed  central bank might influence the exchange rate 
through intervention (see Hung [1991a]). 
Some empirical studies have suggested that intervention could affect 
market expectations.  Hung (1991b), for example, finds evidence that 
intervention influences  unanticipated exchange-rate  changes (calculated from 
survey data) and unanticipated volatility (calculated from option prices). 
Humpage (1988) shows that delineating between the first and subsequent 
interventions is often important, and Loopesko (1984) and Dominguez (1990) 
find that distinguishing  between cooperative and unilateral intervention is 
also worthwhile. 
Because there is no widely accepted theoretical model of the 
intervention/risk-premium mechanism, most empirical studies of intervention 
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and Frankel (1990), however, estimate both effects simultaneously and find a 
statistically significant impact through the portfolio-balance channel, albeit 
one too small to be of practical significance unless augmented by an 
expectations effect.  Ghosh (1989) first controls for any signaling effect and 
then finds a significant role for portfolio balance, although one that implies 
a high cost for intervention. 
This paper follows the approaches found in Loopesko (1984) and 
Dominguez (1990).  Both authors examine the impact of intervention on the 
exchange-rate  risk premia implied by deviation from UIP.  Loopesko uses a 
cumulative measure of intervention to test for its influence through the 
portfolio-balance  channel.  Using data from 1978 through 1980, she finds mixed 
support for such an effect, but also shows that the coefficients on lagged 
exchange-rate  changes and arbitrage profits are often significant, suggesting 
imperfectly efficient markets.  Dominguez (1990) uses daily intervention flows 
to study the 1985-87  period and finds that the influence of intervention 
varies greatly over time.  Both studies, however, show that coordinated 
intervention is more consistently significant than unilateral intervention. 
11. The Empirical Hodel 
UIP and the Risk Premium 
Other studies have defined the exchange-rate  risk premium in terms of 
forward forecast errors (see Hodrick [1987]).  However, with daily data, 
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serial ~orrelation.~  To avoid this problem, we use UIP to generate daily 
observations on an exchange-rate risk premium: 
(1)  RETt - (l+Rt) -  (l+Rt*)  (st/Et[st+ll), 
where 
Rt  - the domestic interest rate, 
~t*  - the foreign interest rate, 
St  - the exchange rate in foreign currency per U.S.  dollar, 
Et[St+l] - the expected one-period-ahead  spot rate, and 
RETt  - the excess return. 
If RETt equals zero, UIP holds.  To generate an empirical measure of 
RETt, we need to account for timing conventions in the foreign exchange 
markets.  In  addition, we note that in uncovered arbitrage, investors do not 
cover the transactions via the forward market. 
Timing conventions in the spot foreign exchange markets allow for two 
business days between the contract date and the deliver date (see Riehl and 
Rodriguez [1977]).  Consequently, foreign currency transactions must be 
completed prior to the investment.  Consider an investor who expects to invest 
dollars overnight on day t.  This investor could buy foreign currency on day 
t-2  for delivery on day t, invest the foreign currency overnight at date t, 
and receive dollars on date t+l, having sold the foreign currency proceeds on 
day t-1  for dollars delivered on day t+l.  As part of this process, the 
Baillie and Osterberg (1991) use daily forward-rate  data in a GARCH 
framework, directly estimating the K4(21)  process for the forecast error. 
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one-day-ahead  investment.  These timing conventions, together with the 
assumption that 
(2)  Et[St+ll - St+l, 
imply 
(3)  RETt - (l+Rt) -  (~+R~*)(s~-~)/s~-~)  - Wt  + FEt* 
In equation (3),  we decompose the excess return into a risk premium 
(RP) and a forecast error (FE).  By utilizing St+l instead of its expectation, 
we introduce an MA(1)  term into FEt.  A regression of RETt on  variables in the 
investor's  information set at the transaction time (t-2)  provides a joint test 
of informational efficiency and of the existence of a risk premium.  Hence, 
assuming informational efficiency, if our measure of intervention  at t-3 
explains RETt, we have evidence that intervention influences the risk premium. 
The Statistical Model 
A substantial body of literature suggests that exchange rates are 
well described as martingales and that their first differences are 
heteroscedastic.  The GARCH framework has been utilized to analyze the 
conditional means and variances of exchange rates with some success.  In 
particular, the usefulness of the conditional student-t  distribution in 
examining daily exchange-rate  data has been demonstrated by Hsieh (1989) and 
Baillie and Bollerslev (1989).  Here, we apply this framework to analyze the 
conditional  mean and variance of the deviation from UIP.  Equations (3) 
through (6) present our GARCH model: 
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vector of explanatory variables, which includes intervention,  an intercept, a 
holiday dummy, and day-of-the-week  dummies.  In equation (4),  the forecast 
error ut follows an MA(1)  process.  Although ARMA  analysis of RETt does not 
help us to distinguish between AR(1)  and MA(1)  representations for equation 
(4),  the theory implies that overlapping forecast intervals result in an MA(1) 
form, with which we proceed.  Augmented Dickey-Fuller  tests reject the 
hypothesis of a unit root in Yt.  Equation (5) indicates that the distribution 
of et, conditional on the information se6 It,l,  is assumed to be student-t 
with a mean of zero, a variance of ht, and a dist.ributiona1  parameter, v.  As 
v approaches 30, this distribution approaches normality.  As equation (6) 
shows, we utilize a GARCH(1,l) parameterization with an intercept.  4 
We introduce intervention (dated t-3) into the model in two forms. 
Following Loopesko (1984), we cumulate intervention from the beginning of our 
series in 1977.  Intervention  calculated in this manner seems more 
In two earlier drafts of this paper, we also explored a model that 
incorporated intervention in the variance equation and allowed for 
GARCH-in-mean.  Neither effect was present.  We did not include these 
specifications in the present paper because they greatly complicate estimation 
over the shorter subperiod. 
Although our estimation period is January 6,  1983 to February 19, 1990, 
our data on intervention extend back to January 3, 1977. 
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relationship between relative asset stocks and the risk premium.  In the 
portfolio-balance  theory, the identity of countries intervening should not 
matter.  Accordingly, our first measure of cumulative intervention, identified 
as CUM2 in the tables, combines the cumulative intervention of the two 
principal countries in each market, either the United States and Germany or 
the United States and Japan.  The second portfolio-balance  measure, CUMROW, is 
the cumulative aggregate intervention  of the G10 countries less that of the 
two principal countries in each case.  In our implementation of equation (3), 
we calculate the relative risk premium in terms of dollars.  Negative 
(positive) values of the intervention  data represent dollar sales (purchases), 
which, when sterilized,  result in an increase (decrease) in dollar-denominated 
assets.  Consequently, a negative coefficient on either CUM2 or CUMROW would 
be consistent with the portfolio-balance approach.  6 
In our tests of the impact of cumulative intervention, the null 
hypothesis is that markets are efficient and no portfolio-balance  effect 
exists.  Our use of cumulative, official intervention as a proxy for relative 
asset supplies implicitly assumes that investors  have accurate information 
about intervention.  If such is not the case, or if markets are inefficient, 
it is possible that intervention  matters even if we do not reject our null. 
Thus, failure to reject leaves open the possibility that intervention is 
transmitting information to the market.  As  a further test of this possibility 
(and following Dominguez [1990]), we enter intervention  without cumulating the 
data (intervention  on date t-3  only).  In this case, we also distinguish 
See Edison (1990) and Weber (1986) for further discussions of this point. 
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define intervention as coordinated when the two principal central banks in a 
particular market undertake similar transactions on the same day.  The tables 
that follow designate this type of intervention as COORD.  We consider 
intervention to be unilateral if only one of the two principal countries 
transacts at a particular time, or if one buys while the other sells.  In the 
tables, UNIL(A)  refers to unilateral U.S.  intervention, and UNIL(F)  refers to 
unilateral German or Japanese intervention.  Though we lack a theory implying 
particular signs for the coefficients on the coordinated and unilateral 
intervention terms, we expect stronger influences for the former, 
especially during periods when such agreements had been reached and widely 
publicized. 
Data 
Our sample period is January 6, 1983 to February 19, 1990, with 1,773 
daily observations, excluding lags.  We obtained exchange-rate and interest- 
rate data from the Paris market through DRIFACS PLUS (1988). '  Yen-dollar 
and mark-dollar exchange rates are bid quotes as of 2:00  p.m.  in Paris and are 
constructed as cross-rates  for each currency quoted against the French franc. 
Interest rates, which we converted to a daily basis, are overnight 
Eurocurrency deposit rates, quoted on a 360-day  basis, as of 9:30  a.m.  The 
Paris market is the only one containing a complete set of data, most notably 
overnight Euroyen deposits. 
The ultimate source is Credit Lyonnais, Paris. 
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data.  These include the net daily dollar transactions  by Germany, Japan, and 
the United States, and the total for the GI0 countries.  Since the Board 
maintains all intervention transactions at their original dollar equivalents, 
we avoid any simultaneity problems associated with conversion.  Over the 
period investigated,  all U.S.  intervention  was against the mark or yen, except 
for a single purchase of $16.4 million equivalent British pounds in February 
1985 (see Cross [1985,  p. 581). 
We estimate the GARCH(1.1)  model over the full sample period and 
over four subperiods that seem to represent different U.S.  intervention 
regimes.  During the first subperiod, January 6, 1983 to December 31, 1984, 
the United States rarely intervened, arguing that intervention  was 
ineffectual.  Germany, on the other hand, intervened often during this 
interval, while Japan intervened less frequently and undertook no unilateral 
transactions.  The volume and frequency of U.S.  intervention then increased 
markedly during the second subperiod, January 2, 1985 through December 31, 
1985, especially following the Plaza Accord on September 23.  The third 
subperiod, January 2, 1986 through February 20, 1987,  marks a period of no 
U.S.  intervention that ended with the Louvre Accord on February 23, 1987. 
Germany and Japan did intervene during this time.  The volume and frequency of 
U.S.,  German, and Japanese intervention again rose sharply in the last 
subperiod, February 23, 1987 through February 19, 1990.  A closer coordination 
of intervention also marked this last time frame. 
Our empirical approach was to first estimate the basic structure of 
the model, exclusive of the intervention terms, over the full sample period. 
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intervention for the full sample period and for the four subperiods. 
111. Results 
The Basic Model 
The first column of table 1 shows the results for the estimates of the 
basic model.  Preliminary likelihood ratio tests supported 1) the inclusion of 
the MA(1)  term, 2) the inclusion of each GARCH term (alpha, beta),  and 3) the 
assumption  of non-normality.  Conditional non-normality  is permitted by 
allowing the data to determine the value of the distributional term (l/v). 
The Ljung-Box  Q statistics for the residuals, adjusted for heteroscedasticity 
(Q/ht 5), do not show significant serial correlation.  The adjusted Q2 
statistics (Q2/ht) for the squared residuals further suggest that the GARCH 
specification is largely successful in removing heteroscedasticity.  The 
sample statistics for skewness (Bl) and kurtosis (B2),  however, are larger 
than we would prefer.  Under the null of conditional  normality, B1 is 
distributed normally with mean zero and variance 6/n (n - number of 
observations). Under the same null, B2 is distributed normally with mean three 
and variance 24/11. 
Unlike Dominguez (1990) and Loopesko (1984).  we test for holiday and 
day-of-the-week  effects in  both the conditional  mean and conditional variance 
equations, utilizing likelihood ratio tests to determine which dummies to 
retain for the subsequent estimations.  The basic equations, to which we added 
intervention terms, are given in column 2 of table 1.  Recall from above that 
we introduce intervention dated t-3  so that we can reasonably assume our risk 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmpremia (which involve variables dated t-2,  t-1, and t)  reflect intervention 
information available to market participants. 
The dummy variables correspond to the t-1  date.  For the mark-dollar 
risk premium, we find a Thursday effect in the mean and a U.S.  holiday effect 
in the variance.  The Thursday effect may reflect the tendency of U.S.  and 
German monetary policy announcements to fall on this day.  For the yen-dollar 
case, the conditional variance is higher on Fridays and on days following U.S. 
holidays.  These results are similar to those of Baillie and Bollerslev 
(1989),  who find a Friday effect in their analysis of exchange-rate 
changes.  8 
riod 
In column 3 of table 1,  we introduce two portfolio-balance  terms to 
the conditional-mean  equation: the cumulative intervention of the principal 
central banks (denoted  as CUM2)  and cumulative intervention of the rest of the 
G10 (denoted as CUHROW).  Because of possible collinearity between these 
terms, we examine their joint significance using likelihood ratio tests.  For 
the mark-dollar case, the likelihood ratio (chi-squared)  test with two degrees 
of freedom suggests that the cumulative intervention terms are jointly 
significant.  For the yen-dollar  case, the regressors are not jointly 
significant, suggesting no portfolio-balance  effect in the yen-dollar  market. 
We note, however, that both intervention coefficients are positive in the 
mark-dollar case.  It is difficult to interpret this result as a 
portfolio-balance effect, since the logic of the portfolio-balance channel 
See also So (1987) and McFarland, Petit, and Sung (1987). 
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premium on dollars. 
In  column 4,  we introduce coordinated and unilateral intervention 
flows.  The results show that neither coordinated  nor unilateral U.S. 
interventions are statistically significant in either market.  Only unilateral 
German and Japanese interventions matter, and in each case, sales of dollars 
increase the risk premium. 
Intervention over the Sub~eriods 
I 
I 
For the 1983-84  subperiod, when the United States rarely intervened 
and undertook no unilateral transactions against the Japanese yen, likelihood 
ratio tests show that intervention  was not statistically significant (see 
table 2).  Although the results do not support the portfolio channel, we note 
that the volume of intervention  was relatively small up to 1985.  Within the 
context of the expectations channel, our findings suggest that central-bank 
intervention did not credibly communicate inside information during this 
period. 
In 1985, intervention  volumes increased sharply, particularly after 
September 23.  During this time, a joint test of cumulative intervention  terms 
is statistically significant in the mark-dollar case, but not in the 
yen-dollar case (see table 3).  The individual coefficient on cumulative U.S. 
plus German intervention is statistically significant, but positive.  When the 
model specification includes coordinated and unilateral interventions, only 
the former appears to be statistically significant for the yen-dollar case. 
The United States did not intervene during 1986 (see table 4),  and 
neither Japanese nor German cumulative interventions had a significant impact. 
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intervention  was statistically significant. 
The volwne and frequency of both U.S.  and foreign intervention rose 
once again in our final subperiod as countries attempted to coordinate 
interventions  more closely (see table 5).  Here, the cumulative intervention 
terms in the mark-dollar  case are jointly significant, but only at a 10 
percent confidence level.  In the yen-dollar case, the cumulative intervention 
terms are not significant.  When we redefine intervention  as coordinated and 
unilateral flows, only unilateral German intervention is statistically 
significant. 
'  IV.  Conclusion 
Using official data on daily dollar intervention  and a GARCH 
specification to model the deviation from UIP, we test for the impact of 
intervention on foreign exchange risk premia.  We adopt two general 
specifications of intervention.  In one, we calculate cumulative intervention, 
vhich is broadly consistent with the portfolio-balance  approach.  In the 
other, we consider coordinated and unilateral intervention flows, which are 
broadly consistent with the expectations channel.  By examining subperiods,  we 
hope to control for shifts in intervention  policies that could confound 
results for the full sample period. 
As with other empirical studies of intervention, the results are 
mixed.  None of the intervention terms is consistently significant across all 
time periods, and we find little support for the portfolio-balance channel. 
Dollar intervention took place in each subperiod,  and from the perspective of 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfmthe portfolio-balance  approach, we would expect the coefficients on the 
cumulative intervention terms to be consistently significant.  Moreover, these 
coefficients were typically positive. 
When we examine the expectations channel, we reach the surprising 
conclusion that unilateral intervention is significant  more often than 
coordinated intervention.  One interpretation of this would be that 
I 
coordination did not clarify exchange-rate  policies or intentions.  An 
exception to this interpretation  was the coordination of U.S.  and Japanese 
intervention in 1985, the year of the Plaza Accord.  At that time, the market 
expected fundamental changes in 63  monetary and fiscal policy, but, as Humpage 
(1988) indicates,  Germany seemed less willing than Japan to follow through. 
We also find that unilateral U.S.  intervention is never significant and that 
in the 1983-84  subperiod,  when the United States discredited an active 
intervention policy, no intervention  variable seemed significant. 
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I  LogLikelihood  1 
I  B1  for E/SQRT(H)  I 
(  B2forE/SQRT(H)  I 
I  Q(15)  for E  I 
I  Q(15)  for E/SQRT(H)  I 
I  Q(15)forEn2  I 
I  Q(15)  for  EnU(H)  I  ............................ 
m: set table I. 
Note:  t-statistics an  in  prcnthcscs. 
Data Sarrccs:  DRI  FACS  PLUS;  and  OF  OOIlERNORS  OF  THE  FEDERAL  RESERE  SYSTEM. 
clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm